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Federal Sentencing During the Interregnum:
Defense Practice as the Blakely Dust Settles
Although the long term impact of Blakely v. Washington'
is not yet clear, no one can doubt that the case raises a
host of immediate, significant and perplexing practical
questions for federal criminal defense attorneys. The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a pair of cases
raising Blakelyissues' and oral argument is scheduled for
October 4, 2004. It seems likely that the Supreme Court
will offer some guidance by Thanksgiving.3 Until the
Court rules, uncertainty will continue as the lower courts
interpret Blakely in disparate ways. 4 Once the Court does
rule, many hard questions may remain unanswered. This
articles suggests how defense counsel can effectively
represent clients during this period of uncertainty. 5
A.
We start with the observation that Blakely should be
understood by defense lawyers as much more than a sen-
tencing case.6 Although the Supreme Court may tell us
otherwise, Blakely can fairly be read to require proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt, to a jury, of all facts necessary to
support an upward sentencing adjustment or departure. It
thus suggests that what we formerly understood as "sen-
tencing factors" are now much more akin to traditional
statutory "elements," to be pleaded and proved in much
the same manner.7 In this period of uncertainty, and
perhaps for some time into the future, counsel must think
about Blakely at the inception of a case and consider its
effect on pretrial motions, including motions to dismiss
indictments, discovery and evidentiary issues. We must
also question the continued vitality of what we thought
was settled law, including the constitutionality of judicial
fact finding in mandatory minimum sentencing8 and the
.prior conviction exception" of Almendarez-Torres.9 Of
course, Blakely presents novel issues as well. Counsel
must start thinking about bifurcated trials, sentencing
juries, jury instructions on sentencing issues and Blakely
waivers. In short, defense counsel must consider argu-
ing Blakely's implications from bail" through habeas
petitions."
We should also recognize that most cases will continue
to result in guilty pleas. The expansion of the federal
criminal code, the severity of sentencing provisions and
the twenty-year shift of discretion from judges to the
executive branch still give federal prosecutors tremendous
bargaining power in many cases, notwithstanding their
new burdens. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many
prosecutors are making relatively better offers to secure
Blakelywaivers during this period of uncertainty. Blakelys
long term impact on plea negotiations is uncertain and
has been the subject of debate among academics, as
well as between the majority and dissenting justices in
Blakely. Would a Blakely-ized federal sentencing scheme
redistribute power back to judges and defendants, or
would it bring even more overcharging to induce pleas?Whether Blakely will help or hurt a particular client
whose case is adjudicated during this period of ferment
depends on the facts of the case, the current Blakely views
of the trial judge (or the Circuit in which he or she sits),
the general sentencing philosophy of the trial judge, and
an analysis of the possible Supreme Court rulings in
Booker and Fanfan. Although this abstract answer is not
terribly helpful, it perhaps highlights the central problem:
case analysis and strategic decision-making is severely
hampered by the current uncertainty. It is critical for
defense counsel to be alert not only for opportunities to
better a client's sentence, but also to preserve various pre-
trial and trial issues, to exploit "collateral" Blakelybenefits
- e.g., additional discovery - and to be wary of Blakely's
possible downside application to a particular case.
For example, a Guidelines sentence may protect a
particularly unappealing defendant from a discretionary
sentence at or near the statutory maximum.2 Defense
counsel may well defend the Guidelines in such a case.
Similarly, a Guidelines sentencing range in Zone A or
Zone B - which allows for a non-incarcerative sentence
- may be preferable to a statutory o-5 year range. On the
other hand, an offense whose Guideline range appears to
be unfairly driven by uncharged conduct may well yield a
better sentence if the Guidelines are held unconstitutional.
Further complicating matters is the crucial question
of severability. 3 If the Supreme Court holds that Blakely
applies to the Guidelines, it will also have to determine
whether the Guidelines as a whole continue to function.
That is, whether Congress would have preferred - over
the pre-S RA discretionary sentencing scheme - a system
in which enhancements are subject to jury trial rights,
whereas downward adjustments may be found by a judge
to a preponderance. If not, courts will also have to decide
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whether the Guidelines. can be severed from other parts
of the SRA, including the abolition of parole and the
implementations of supervised release.
Thus, analysis of the most favorable sentencing scheme
for a particular client is only the beginning. For example, if
your client would benefit from a Guidelines sentence, and
the court will likely impose a Guidelines, either because
that is the view of the trial judge or the Circuit court has
directed that result, counsel should still consider whether
to raise Blakely objections to protect the record, knowing
that an appeal could be withdrawn if subsequent events
make that prudent. 4 The desirability of preserving the
issue will depend on counsel's evaluation of how the
client would fare on remand under regimes of strong
severability, different flavors of intermediate severability,
and non-severability. Counsel would also have to evaluate
the likelihood that higher sentences on remand will be
limited by ex post facto or double jeopardy concerns,
as well as the possibility that the Court will surprise us
with a ruling on some particular issue that benefits some
narrow class of cases. Similar considerations will inform
whether counsel will choose to defend the Guidelines, or
more likely some particular (Blakely influenced, perhaps)
Guidelines calculation before a discretionary sentencing
judge, even if the discretionary sentence to be imposed is
likely to be favorable.
Strategic decision-making in this context requires
answers, or at least informed predictions, for a host
of questions. Lawyers must now ponder: What kind
of benefit will the prosecutor offer in exchange for a
waiver of a defendant's Blakely rights? Will the judge
simply impose a discretionary sentence that matches
the Guidelines range that would have applied? Will the
prosecutor threaten to supersede to charge additional
mandatory minimum counts or sentencing factors? Will
the judge allow a jury to consider Guidelines factors? Will
the government have admissible sentencing evidence
sufficient for proof beyond a reasonable doubt? Each of
these questions must be considered in light of potential
appeals and possible remedies on remand.
B.
With these considerations in mind, we turn to the
specific application of Blakely in various settings. We
have organized the discussion by dividing cases into six
procedural postures:
i. Cases in which a sentence was imposed prior to
Blakely and an appeal is pending.
2. Cases in which there is a pre-Blakely jury verdict
of guilt and sentence is pending.
3. Cases in which a plea of guilty was entered prior
to Blakely and sentence is pending.
4. Cases in which a pre-Blakely indictment is
pending.
5. Cases in which a post-Blakely indictment is
pending.
6. Cases in which no formal charge has been
brought.
Although there is fair overlap among the issues raised,
each category presents distinct issues.
I. Sentence Imposed and Appeal Pending
Blakely applies to all cases that were not "final" on June
24, 2004, the day the decision was issued.'5 Thus, Blakely
(whatever it may stand for in any particular courtroom)
applies to any case in which a petition for certiorari is
still undecided or the time to file the petition has not yet
run.'6 Since it is likely that counsel did not lodge a consti-
tutional objection to the imposition of enhancements in
the trial court, many of these cases will pose preservation
problems.'7 Blakelyerrors not preserved below are subject
to demanding standard of plain error review. The judicial
support for finding plain error in this setting is rather
weak, however, with one Circuit denying plain error re-
view and, one Circuit suggesting plain error review would
be appropriate. 8
If counsel has not yet filed a brief in a case in which
sentence was imposed before Blakely was issued, Blakely
issues not raised below may still be raised on appeal,
and should be argued as plain error. If counsel has
already filed a brief, consideration may be given to filing
a supplemental brief, although some courts have rejected
supplemental briefing.'9 If counsel was prescient enough
to have preserved the relevant issues below, a pat on the
back is in order.
In some circuits, Blakely issues are being held deferred
until the Supreme Court decides Booker and Fanfano
while other circuits are ruling on cases as they arise.2 In
the former jurisdictions, holding Blakley issues until the
Supreme Court rules, the issues must still be raised by
counsel to preserve them for post-Booker review by the
appellate courts.
If the Supreme Court overturns the Guidelines, some
of these pre-Blakely Guidelines sentences will be reversed.
Remanded cases will pose novel double jeopardy and
ex post facto issues. Can the government seek a new
indictment adding sentencing factors after remand?22 If
the law is changed by the Courts or Congress before the
remanded case is resentenced, and the changes would
lengthen the sentence, there may well be ex post facto
problems with imposing the new sentence. 3
I. Post-Trial, Presentence Cases
Cases that went to trial before Blakely and will be sen-
tenced in this interim period pose a host of interesting
questions. If the judge has held the Guidelines consti-
tutional, sentencing will be familiar, but counsel will
probably want to preserve all Blakely issues. Counsel
should be careful to object to both judicial, as opposed to
jury, fact-finding and to the lower standard of, and less
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formal, proof than that required by Blakely.14 Objections
to supervised release, restitution and other incidents of
sentencing that could fall with a strong version of non-
severability should also be preserved. 5 If the sentence
involves mandatory minimums, counsel may be advised
to challenge both the Guidelines and the continued vitality
of mandatory minimums under Harris, after Blakely.
26
Similarly, if the sentence involves a prior conviction as an
aggravating sentencing factor, counsel should consider
preserving a challenge to Almendarez-Torres27 in the
post-Blakely world.
If the judge holds the Guidelines unconstitutional
after a jury verdict of guilt on a pre-Blakely indictment
and there are aggravating sentencing factors at issue, the
judge may choose among or combine:
A. Discretionary Sentencing with, or without, an
Alternative Guidelines Sentence
Some judges have returned to old law discretionary
sentencing. 8 Their sentences are bounded only by the
statutory minimum and maximum. Although this option
may be the simplest among the alternatives, it still raises
difficult questions. In some cases, counsel may see ad-
vantage in joining the Government in arguing that the
Guidelines survive Blakely. This is especially true for cases
with very low guidelines ranges and high statutory maxi-
mums. Of course, counsel will have to make an informed
judgment about the probable length of the discretionary
sentence the judge will impose. Some defendants may also
value the relative predictability of a Guidelines sentence
over discretionary sentencing.
In addition to arguing that the Guidelines survive
Blakely, defense counsel might also consider an ex post
facto argument if the discretionary sentence is higher than
the top of the otherwise-applicable Guidelines range. This
claim takes the case into uncharted waters but presents a
reasonable argument for the defendant.
Whether or not counsel objects to the revival of old
law discretionary sentencing, he or she should evaluate
the judge's position on other incidents of sentencing,
including fines, restitution and supervised release. All are
vulnerable to attack on a strong version of unseverability,
which would render the whole Sentencing Reform Act
unconstitutional. It is fair to say that Blakelys impact on
restitution is uncertain, 9 and some have suggested that if
the SRA is unconstitutional, parole is back.30 To the extent
discretionary fines exceed those that could be imposed
under the Guidelines, they too are subject to attack.
We also suggest that counsel should be careful about
making factual concessions in the course of an old fash-
ioned sentencing pitch. The old strategy of seeking judicial
mercy by with a fulsome statement of remorse for all one's
wrongdoings may pose risks in this period of uncertainty.
If the Supreme Court upholds the Guidelines and the
case comes back for resentencing, those factual statement
could be admissions justifying an increased sentencing
range on remand.
B. A Partial Guidelines Sentence
Some courts have also held that the unconstitutional
aspects of the Guidelines are severable from the con-
stitutional aspects. Typically, these rulings eliminate all
aggravating factors, but give the defendant the benefit of
downward adjustments and permit Guidelines sentenc-
ing on the basis of facts found by the jury or admitted
by the defendant. This approach will usually result in a
more favorable sentence than the application of the full
Guidelines. Counsel should, however, evaluate whether a
completely discretionary sentence would be advantageous.
For example, counsel might well consider challenging the
severability of the Guidelines in cases in which the of-
fense carries a high Guidelines base offense level or the
defendant was convicted upon an "Apprendi-ized" in-
dictment that included allegations of drug quantity. In
other words, even if there is no enhancement, a defendant
may still have a Blakely argument based on the possible
unconstitutionality of the Guidelines as a whole.
C. "Blakely-ized" Sentencing
If the trial court determines that Blakely applies to the
guidelines and that the government can prove sentencing
factors to the jury (notwithstanding that those factors
were not charged in the indictment), the court would have
to empanel a sentencing jury. Although this approach
represents the most straightforward application of Blakely,
it appears to be rarely employed. This is because Blakely-
ized sentencing raises a host of difficult issues. If the jury
has already rendered a verdict, the government's effort to
secure a new indictment, charging sentencing facts, raises
significant double jeopardy concerns." In addition, there
is no statutory authority for empanelling a sentencing
jury.3
But if counsel faces a sentencing jury, the proceeding
should be approached as a whole new trial. Counsel
should request a pre-trial motions schedule and consider
all available challenges to the new charging document. In
addition to the double jeopardy issues, fifth amendment
challenges to the charging instrument should also be
considered. If the government does not return to the grand
jury, but puts some other form of sentencing charging
document in front of the jury, there are grounds to argue
that the fifth amendment grand jury right to indictment
by grand jury has been violated. 3 If the prosecution does
return to the grand jury, defense counsel may raise double
jeopardy concerns,34 arguing that the unconstitutionality
of the Guidelines infects this use of the grand jury, as well
as arguing that there is simply no statutory or other legal
authority for the proceedings.
The full panoply of "pre-trial" tactics should be con-
sidered and employed. Formal discovery should be de-
manded. Counsel should read Rule 16 broadly and con-
sider the range of discovery is now relevant and required.
A bill of particulars may be especially useful in situations
in which judges reject the argument that a new indictment
is required, particularly when those cases involve relevant
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conduct such as other drug deals that were formerly not
pled or subject to formal discovery. Evidentiary issues
should also be considered. Although old style sentencing
hearings were not governed by the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, Blakely sentencing proceedings are more akin to
trials before juries. Presumably, the government cannot
proceed by proffer and affidavit, as was the practice for
sentencing hearings under the Guidelines and under the
old sentencing law.5
Counsel should also consider the range of mitigating
evidence that is relevant at this new proceeding. If the
government seeks to prove the defendant was a leader
or organizer, the defendant may take the position that
all evidence tending to show minimal participation is
relevant to negate that factual finding. That would appear
likely even if the judge finds that the ultimate decision
on that mitigating factor is for the court, not the jury, on
some version of severability.
Finally, some judges are covering more than one
base by issuing sentences in the alternative, often a
discretionary sentence that happens to be within the
Guidelines range) 6 Counsel may consider making a
record about the similarity of the two sentences in an
effort to preserve the issue, although we hold out no
great hope for relief when the alternative sentences are
identical.37
Ill. Cases Awaiting Sentence in which a Guilty Plea was
Entered Before Blakely
Defendants in this category may be in the best position.
The government may be precluded by the double jeop-
ardy clause from seeking enhancements by means of a
superseding indictment, or discouraged from making the
effort by the risk of successful appeal. Thus, where judges
hold the Guidelines severable, defendants may well reap
a windfall - a base offense level sentence. The issue may
be complicated, however, if the defendant entered into a
plea agreement or made factual admissions during the
plea. Pre-Blakely plea agreements are unlikely to satisfy
Blakely since there is typically no waiver of the jury trial
right.38 Moreover, any factual stipulation, it should be ar-
gued, is properly read only as an acknowledgment that the
government would be able to prove the fact to the court by
a preponderance of the evidence (not beyond a reasonable
doubt), and perhaps only on the basis of inadmissible
evidence - not as a plea of guilty to the sentencing "ele-
ment" of the crime. A pre-Blakely plea agreement should
not be sufficient to waive Blakely rights.
In the post-plea pre-sentence phase, counsel also has
the possibility of a Rule ii(d) motion to withdraw the plea
upon a showing of a "fair and just reason." For example,
if a defendant pled expecting moderate Guidelines and
now faces a harsh sentencing judge who has reclaimed
discretionary authority, withdrawal might be attractive. Of
course, withdrawal only gets returns the defendant back
to the pre-plea stage, but cases will arise in which a trial,
or new, Blakely-ized negotiations with the prosecutor will
be preferable to discretionary sentencing or some other
version of Blakely federal sentencing.
Some judges may seek explicit waivers of Blakelyrights
at the time of sentence3 9 Some defendants will see no
disadvantage to waiving and protecting their deals. In
other cases counsel might try to explore the judge's view
on the waiver. Absent a waiver, some judges may turn to
some form of Blakely-ized sentencing to protect the record,
even on a plea, while other judges may try to protect the
record, but will not be inclined to impose consequences
for the failure to waive Blakely rights. Resisting judicial
efforts to extract a waiver can put the defense in a difficult
situation in some courtrooms.
If the judge proposes Blakley-ized sentencing in re-
sponse to a defendant's reluctance to waive Blakely rights,
counsel might argue that the plea agreement already in
place sets the upper limit of the sentencing facts that may
be charged by the government. On this view, arguably
supported by the ex post facto clause, the sentencing trial
should be free, in the sense that the worst outcome would
be a verdict of guilty to the sentencing facts that establish
the bargained for range. In this scenario, better outcomes
include the range of verdicts rejecting some or all of the
sentencing facts. It seems unlikely, however, that a judge
and prosecutor would not exact some price from a defen-
dant who refused to waive and put the system to the cost
of a sentencing trial.
Judges, or prosecutors, may seek waiver of both Blakely
rights at the trial level and appellate review of the waiver,
the procedures and the outcome. Given the high degree
of uncertainty we now face, we urge counsel to be very
cautious in waiving these rights. They are of greater value
now and defendants should receive some significant
benefit from giving them up.
IV. Open Case Indicted Before Blakely
The uncertainty surrounding Blakelys potential appli-
cation to the sentencing guidelines presents defendants
facing open, pre-Blakely indictments with a unique bar-
gaining opportunity during the interregnum. Although
the government can easily seek a superseding indictment
to charge sentencing enhancements, and has done so
in a number of cases, the filing of a superseder may
provide the defendant with greater insight into possible
sentencing factors as well as trigger Rule i6 discovery
obligations on the part of the government. On the other
hand, if the government supersedes, the defendant may
not be able to plead to the indictment without accepting all
of the charged sentencing enhancements.4° Another risk
is that the government may supersede to charge additional
counts carrying mandatory minimum sentences, such as
adding a 924(c) count to a drug indictment.4'
Given that most federal criminal cases result in guilty
pleas, counsel facing a pre-Blakely indictment will likely
find the most beneficial strategy to be a waiver of a
defendant's Blakely rights in exchange for sentencing
concessions by the government. Blakely has created
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an administrative headache for the government as the
backlog of criminal cases expands during this period of
uncertainty. By necessity, a greater premium is being
placed on moving cases through the system. Defendants
may be able to capitalize on the situation by negotiating
Guidelines plea or cooperation agreements that include
"Blakely waivers."
By waiving Blakely rights, a defendant agrees that the
Guidelines apply to the case and that sentencing factors
do not have to be submitted to a jury and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. As of August 25, 2004, the relevant
language in standard plea and cooperation agreements in
the Southern District of New York is:
By entering this plea agreement, the defendant agrees
to waive all constitutional challenges to the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines. Specifically, the defendant waives any
right to have facts that the law makes essential to
punishment either (i) charged in an information or
indictment, (2) proven to a jury, or (3) proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. The defendant explicitly consents
to be sentenced pursuant to the application of the
applicable Sentencing Guidelines and to have his
sentence imposed (including any enhancements, ad-
justments and departures) based on facts to be found
by the sentencing judge by a preponderance of the
evidence. The defendant explicitly acknowledges that
his entry of a guilty plea to the charged offenses au-
thorizes the sentencing court to impose any sentence,
up to and including the statutory maximum sentence.
The defendant understands that, in determining the
applicable Sentencing Guidelines, the sentencing
court may consider any reliable evidence, including
hearsay.
The waiver may be overbroad. It is not clear whether
a defendant may waive the proof beyond a reasonable
doubt standard, or even the applicability of the rules
of evidence.42 The issue is likely to arise only in cases
in which there are disputed sentencing factors and the
district court finds, by a preponderance, the existence of an
aggravating fact. Because the benefit to the defendant of a
Blakelywaiver would be to obtain sentencing concessions,
however, it seems unlikely that the defendant would sign
such a plea agreement without a stipulated Guidelines
range. In such cases, the sentencing facts will be admitted
and uncontested, thus pretermitting the burden of proof
question. In short, efforts to remove the burden of proof
language in Blakely waivers is probably not an effective
use of a defendant's negotiating capital outside that small
class of cases in which there will be a sentencing hearing
or there is a real risk that the court will not abide by the
parties' stipulation.43
In deciding whether to waive the benefits of Blakely, a
defendant must carefully balance a number of competing
factors. The primary factor, or course, is the sentencing
benefit the government is willing to confer in exchange
for the waiver. Defense counsel will have to measure
that concrete benefit against, among other things, the
sentencing judge's Blakely rulings (if any) and general
sentencing philosophy. If the judge has held that Blakely
applies and the government must prove aggravating
circumstances, a defendant is in an enviable position.
Presumably he can extract a significant concession in
exchange for relieving the government of the burden of
superseding the indictment and proving enhancements
to a sentencing jury. Indeed, the government might
be reluctant to prove enhancements in a sentencing
proceeding in which the rules of evidence would likely
apply, for example, if doing so would compromise a
cooperating witness.
If the judge believes the Guidelines are non-severable,
however, counsel must proceed with caution. In those
cases, it is important to understand the judge's general
sentencing philosophy to appreciate the benefits and risks
of discretionary sentencing.
Another important factor is counsel's prediction of the
outcome of Supreme Court Blakely cases. The more likely
one believes that the Court will rule that Blakely applies to
the Guidelines, the greater concession one may seek on
a Guidelines plea. On the other hand, if counsel believes
that the Supreme Court will distinguish the Guidelines
from the Washington State sentencing scheme, then
it may be preferable to lock the government in to a
lower guidelines sentence rather than to seek benefits
under Blakely that will not stand up on a government
appeal.
If the parties cannot reach a satisfactory plea agree-
ment, the defendant may still wish to plead guilty to the
indictment and make a sentencing pitch to the trial judge.
Before Blakely, this option was available to defendants
without the government's consent.44 Now, however, the
government has de facto veto power because the court
will undoubtedly allow the government time to supersede
the indictment to charge sentencing factors. Thus, as
a practical matter, defendants wishing to be sentenced
without a plea agreement will most likely have to waive
their Blakely rights and agree to a traditional Guidelines
sentencing procedure.45
Finally, a defendant who is to be sentenced by a
judge who employs a discretionary sentencing scheme
will nonetheless want to determine what the applicable
Guidelines sentencing range would have been. There is
a strong argument that a sentence higher than the top of
that range would violate the due process clause, and thus
the issue should be preserved.
46
V. Pre-indictment Cases
Pre-indictment cases present the greatest uncertainty.
In those circuits that have not given guidance to trial
courts, the views of the sentencing judge - who probably
has not yet have been assigned - will be crucial, but
unknown. Although strategic issues will arise much the
same as they do in cases already indicted, the potential
risks and benefits of various courses of action will be
magnified by the additional uncertainty. Defendants'
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risk-tolerance therefore takes on greater importance in
decision making.47
All of the negotiating considerations discussed above
will apply in this setting, except that the government will
not yet have invested resources in an indictment so there
will be a bit less pre-Blakely inertia. A Blakely waiver will
still be of real value to the government, however, as it will
eliminate the need to secure and litigate a more detailed
Blakely-ized indictment. Of course, some counsel will
see tremendous potential in litigating the host of issues
a Blakely-ized indictment will bring and we now turn to
that class of cases.
VI. Cases in which Blakely Indictments have been Filed
In a small but growing category of cases defendants will be
faced with Blakely-ized indictments that charge sentenc-
ing facts. As we noted above in discussing Blakely-ized
sentencing in post plea and post verdict cases, these in-
dictments open up a host of issue. We urge counsel to
treat the sentencing factors as "elements" of the crime.
Among other things, counsel should expand Rule i6
demands 45 and requests for bills of particular to gain ad-
ditional discovery on these sentencing elements4 9 Using
these tools, counsel should seek to bind the government
to a particular theory of increased sentencing, such as
the method of calculating loss amount or identification
of the victim whose trust was abused. If the government
later seeks to change its theory, it may be subject to
a challenge on grounds of constructive amendment or
variance.
In addition, we urge challenges to these new indict-
ments. Counsel may move to strike sentencing factors
charged in the indictment as prejudicial surplusage -
a meritorious motion if the Supreme Court rules that
Blakely does not apply to the Guidelines. Moreover, even
if Blakely does apply, there is no clear statutory basis
for charging these factors, nor are any of the proce-
dures for bringing these issues to a jury developed.5°
Severance motions (directed to counts of the indictment
or defendants in multi-defendant cases) could be ap-
propriate where sentencing factors introduce damaging
allegations that would not have gone to the jury in the
past.
Counsel should, as we have noted above, be sensi-
tive to the range of evidentiary issues these more de-
tailed indictments could introduce. No one has a good
sense of how a case will be tried under a detailed,
Blakely-ized indictment, or even the acceptable range
of such indictments. But that is very much at the core
of the uncertainty of this moment in federal criminal
practice.
Conclusion
Blakely has thrown federal criminal practice into turmoil.
This period of uncertainty is challenging, but offers many
opportunities for defense counsel. In some cases counsel
will want to move quickly to secure a favorable outcome
during this interim period. It has been broadly noted
that there will be some "sentencing windfalls" in the
next several months. Of course, one person's windfall is
another's just and fair sentence.
In other cases, counsel will choose to move slowly,
preserve the broadest range of issues and look to litigate
through this period of change, with an eye toward
benefitting from one of the upcoming twists and turns in
the law. As always, different cases will require different
approaches, but Blakely has opened up a world of new
possibilities.
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United States v. Mooney, 2004 WL 1636960 (8th Cir. July 27,
2004) (remanding case for consideration of issues raised
under Blakely).
5 The current situation in the trial courts is a bit familiar to
those who recall the period between the effective date of the
Sentencing Reform Act, November 1987, and the Court's
ruling in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989),
which held the Guidelines constitutional. Both periods were
characterized by variations in sentencing practice by the
lower federal courts, even with in the same district.
Compare, e.g., United States v. Sumpter, 690 F. Supp 1274
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Conboy) (holding Guidelines
unconstitutional), with United States v. Hickernell, 690 F.
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Supp 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Brieant) (holding Guidelines
constitutional).
6 Judge Gould, arguing against severability in his dissent from
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ameline, noted that "...the
application of Blakely to the Guidelines may require, among
other things, changes to grand jury procedure, new forms of
arraignments, revision of plea colloquy procedures,
resolution of novel evidence and trial issues, whole new
forms of jury instructions, possibly a bifurcated trial for
sentencing, and decision on a host of other issues perhaps
not yet identified .... Ameline, 376 F.3d at 987 (Gould, J.
dissenting).
District of Nebraska Judge Batillon noted, "[t]his court reads
Blakely, together with the cases on which it is premised, as
establishing that a fact that enhances a defendant's sentence
beyond the maximum, as understood in Blakely, operates as
the functional equivalent of an element and must be charged
in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt." United States v. Terrell, 2004 WL
1661018 at *5 (D. Neb. July 22, 2004).
Before Blakely, the Supreme Court affirmed mandatory
minimum sentencing based on facts found by judges. United
States v. Harris, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (holding that Apprendi
does not apply statutory mandatory minimum sentences).
Harris is already the subject of much well founded criticism
and is quite hard to square with Blakely. Although all
reasonable Court observers would agree that the Supreme
Court is unlikely to abandon a recent and clear precedent,
almost all reasonable observers predicted Blakely would
come out the other way. We urge defense counsel to consider
preserving challenges to Harris and mandatory minimum
sentencing, at least during this period of greatest
uncertainty. The few lawyers who preserved Apprendi
challenges to the Guidelines in the face of clear precedent
may have looked silly three months ago, but now they look
like geniuses.
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1997)
(holding that sentencing enhancements based on the fact of
a prior conviction are beyond the reach of Apprendi).
10 Some of the early action in Blakely has been in bail motions.
In the Southern District of New York, Judge Cedarbaum cited
Blakely in granting release pending appeal to Martha Stewart,
although Judge Cedarbaum also ruled that Blakely had no
impact on the Guidelines. United States v. Stewart, No. 03 Cr.
717 (MGC) (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2004) (memo endorsement).
In the same district, Judge Pauley rejected a motion for bail
pending resentencing in which a well developed Blakely
argument had been advanced. United States v. Lauersen,
2004 WL 1713186 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2004). Given the
uncertainty in sentencing, lawyers will now be able to argue
that many defendants have lower incentives to flee when
arguing for pre-or post-trial release.
11 Collateral review and the very complex question of
retroactivity are, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this
article.
Given the history of judicial discomfort with the severity of
the Guidelines, cases in which the discretionary sentence is
greater than the presumptive Guidelines range will likely be
rare.
13 The Ninth Circuit has held portions of the Guidelines
unconstitutional, but severable, United States v. Ameline, 376
F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2004), as has the Seventh Circuit, United
States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. Jul. 9, 2004), cert.
granted, 2004 WL 1713654 (Aug. 2, 2004). For a particularly
good discussion of the severability issue, see Judge Nancy
Gertner's opinion in United States v. Mueffleman, 01 Cr 10387
(NG) (D. Mass. July 26, 2004) (holding Guidelines
unconstitutional and unseverable).
14 There will be cases in which the defense notice of appeal will
be met with a cross-appeal. In that case, defense counsel
may not be able to prevent appellate review.
15 Griffith v. Kentcky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
16 Id. See S. Ct. Rule 13 (Review on Certiorari: Time for
Petitioning). The retroactivity issue is also analyzed in both
Bibas, supra note 1, and King & Klein, supra note 1.
1 Many of these cases also pose potential waiver issues, as
many defendants will have entered into pre-Blakely plea
agreements. Waiver issues are discussed below.
18 For a good discussion of the caselaw as of mid-August, see
United States v. Duncan, 2004 WL 1838020 (11th Cir. August
18, 2004) (rejecting plain error review and rather vigorously
contending that Blakely errors cannot be plain because
courts have expressed so many different views on the issue).
The Ninth Circuit has suggested that some Blakely errors
would be reviewable as plain error. United States v. Ameline,
376 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2004). Two well argued discussions
of this issue, neither of which have precedential force, are
Pirani, in which a panel of the Eighth Circuit had found plain
error in a Blakely case, United States v. Pirani, 2004 WL
1748930 (8th Cir. Aug. 5, 2004), vacated on reh'g en banc,
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17012 (8th Cir. Aug. 16, 2004), and
United States v. Koch, 2004 WL 1899930 (6th Cir. August 26,
2004) (en banc) (Martin, J. dissenting) (arguing that Blakely
errors meet plain error test).
19 See, e.g. United States v. Curtis, 380 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir.
2004) (order declining to permit a supplemental brief raising
a Blakely issue for the first time).
For example, the Second Circuit is deciding other issues and
withholding the mandate in cases raising Blakely issues,
directing the parties to file any supplemental papers they
deem appropriate within fourteen days after the Supreme
Court decides Booker and Fantan. See Mincey, supra
note 4.
21 Particularly the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, which have upheld
the Guidelines.
22 The law in this area is unclear. The Supreme Court has held
that jeopardy does not prevent prosecution for murder after
the defendant entered a plea, over the objection of the
government, to one count of the same indictment charging
the lesser included crime of manslaughter. Ohio v. Johnson,
467 U.S. 493 (1984). Nor does double jeopardy bar
reprosecution in the face of changed facts, as when a
defendant convicted of attempted murder is prosecuted for
murder upon the death of the victim. Baumann v. Nelson,
1997 WL 699655 (N.D. III Nov. 7, 1997). But if the
government did not object to the plea at the time, and the
facts have not changed, reindictment after remand may
well pose a significant problem. See United States v. Booker,
375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. Jul. 9, 2004) (noting, but not
deciding, the issue), cert. granted, 2004 WL 1713654 (Aug.
2, 2004).
23 The ex post facto issue will turn, in part, on whether courts
view the changes as procedural, in which a harsher sentence
is more likely to be permissible, or substantive. For a good
discussion, see Bibas, supra note 1 at notes 69-71 and
accompanying text.
24 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 592-93 (2002) (holding that
the imposition of the death penalty requires a jury finding
applying the reasonable doubt standard of proof).
25 For example, the restoration of old law sentencing could
bring back suspended sentences and probation eligibility for
a broader range of cases.
26 See supra note 8.
27 See supra note 9.
28 For an example, see United States v. Mueffleman, supra note
13.
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For a discussion of Blakely's impact on restitution, see United
States v. Wooten, 327 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a
claim that restitution amounts must be found by a jury).
30 Indeed, in Mistretta, the government endorsed the view that
the parole provisions of the SRA were not severable from the
guidelines. The Solicitor General argued in response to one
of the certified questions that "[i]f the Sentencing Reform Act
is held unconstitutional, the provision of the Act abolishing
parole must also be struck down." The Solicitor General
explained:
Because the parole system was an inefficient means of
addressing the problem of disparities in sentencing, Congress
chose to supplant the parole system with the sentencing
guideline system, a more effective vehicle for rationalizing
sentences. But if the guideline system (including the
appellate review process) is struck down and the provision of
the Act abolishing parole is preserved, the result will be to
increase the disparities among sentences, since there will be
no check on the disparate treatment that similarly situated
offenders could receive from different judges. That result
would be fatally inconsistent with Congress's repeatedly
stated intention to eliminate sentencing disparities in the
federal courts. For that reason, we agree with petitioner that
Congress would not have wished to abolish parole if the
guideline system were not available to replace it.
Mistretta v. United States, Brief for the United States, Point
Ill, available at 1988 WL 1026050 (August 29, 1988). The
Court did not reach the issue because it upheld the
Guidelines. See also S. Rep. No. 98-225 at 188-89, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., September 14, 1983; 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3372-73 (SRA delayed implementation of parole and good
time changes to insure that "the [then] current law
provisions relating to the imposition of sentence, the
determination of a prison release date, and the calculation of
good time allowances" would remain effective until the
guidelines "replace[d] the existing sentencing system.").
31 See supra note 22.
32 See United States v. Emmenegger, 04 Cr. 334, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15142, at *54 (S.D.N.Y. August 4, 2004) (GEL)
(noting that sentencing jury trials are not authorized by any
legal authority in the course of a thoughtful argument that
Guidelines survive Blakely).
33 In United States. v. Harris, 2004 WL 1853920 (D.N.J. Aug.
18, 2004), Judge Simandle submitted sentencing factors to
a jury following a conviction. The prosecutor drafted a
"Notice of Sentencing Factors," and the judge rejected the
defendant's fifth amendment grand jury based objections to
this procedure, focusing on the notice prong of the grand
jury right.
Jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn. United States v.
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977).
35 Although Federal Rule of Evidence 1101(d)(3) makes the
rules inapplicable to sentencing proceedings, there is a
strong argument that the rule only applies to judicial
sentencing proceedings and never contemplated jury trials
on sentencing factors, which are akin to jury trials. The
sentencing phase of a federal capital trial is not governed by
the FRE, pursuant to specific statutory authority. 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(j); see United States v. Beckford, 964 F. Supp. 993
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing statute). Although the analogy is
somewhat weak because "death is different," the special
statutory authority taking this jury proceeding outside the
reach of the FRE suggests that in the absence of such special
treatment of Blakley.ized sentencing, the rules would
apply.
36 For a notable example of a judge taking the alternative
sentencing approach seriously, see Emmenegger, supra note
32, in which Judge Lynch of the Southern District of New
York noted he would impose a discretionary sentence of 24
months had he not found the Guidelines still binding, but
imposing a 33 month Guidelines sentence.
3' One court has refused to impose sentences in the alternative,
noting that the Supreme Court may rule that neither a
discretionary sentence, nor a full Guidelines sentence is legal
and arguing that hypothetical rulings are an abdication of
judicial responsibility. U.S. v. Johnson, No. 6:04-00042, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16077 (S.D.W.Va. Aug. 13, 2004).
38 For a good discussion of the waiver issues, noting that the
requirement for proof beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be
waived by the defendant and holding that a pre-Blakely plea
agreement cannot constitute an implicit waiver of Blakely
rights, see United States v. Terrell, 2004 WL 1661018 (D.
Neb. July 22, 2004).
39 While defendants can clearly waive their right to a jury trial
on the sentencing issues, judges should not seek a waiver of
the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Terrell, 2004
WL 1661018, *5 n.3 (noting that the burden of proof is not
the defendant's to waive). Rather, the defendant's factual
admissions, sometimes affirmed by government proffer, are
sufficient to establish the facts to that degree of certainty.
The Blakely sentencing plea will be no different from the
standard Rule 11 plea, in which the defendant waives a jury
trial and "trial rights," FRCrP 11(b)(1)(F), but does not waive
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge must still be
satisfied of factual guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and, in
practice, is always convinced to the requisite degree by the
defendant's admission.
40 Defending against indictments charging sentencing facts is
discussed further in section 6, infra.
41 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
42 Blakely addressed only jury trial - and not standard of proof
- waivers. See 124 S.Ct. at 2541 ("nothing prevents a
defendant from waiving his Apprendi rights ... [and] [i]f
appropriate waivers are procured, States may continue to
offer judicial factfinding as a mater of course to all
defendants who plead guilty"). For an excellent discussion of
the issue, see United States v. Terrell, 2004 WL 1661018, at
*5 n.3 (D. Neb. July 22, 2004) ("Simply put, the standard of
proof is not the defendant's to waive; it is a burden placed on
the government, without which a conviction cannot be
obtained."). See also United States v. O'Daniel, 2004 WL
1767112, at *10 (N.D. Okla. August 6, 2004) ("Logic and
common sense dictate that a judge may not constitutionally
substitute judicial factfinding for jury factfinding under
Blakely without a more exacting standard of proof and the
application of the rules of evidence."). But see United States
v. Khan, 2004 WL 1616460 at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004)
(Weinstein, J.) (defendant "may waive or stipulate to avoid
Blakely); United States v. Harris, 2004 WL 1622035 at *3
(W.D. Pa. July 16, 2004) (accepting parties' waiver of
Blakely's application to pre-Blakely plea agreement).
43 Generally speaking, plea agreements also include a waiver of
a defendant's appellate rights, at least if the sentence
imposed is within the range stipulated by the parties. These
waivers make it even less likely that the burden of proof issue
will be preserved for further review.
- See FRCrP 11(a)(1) ("A defendant may plead guilty, not
guilty, or (with the court's consent) nolo contendere.").
45 One somewhat risky strategy may allow the defendant two
bites at the sentencing apple. To exploit this option, the
defendant would plead guilty to the indictment (assuming it
has not been superseded to charge sentencing factors) and
to take a position on Blakely's application to the Guidelines
inconsistent with the trial judge's previous Blakely rulings.
For example, if the judge has been imposing indeterminate
sentences, then defense counsel would argue that Blakely
either does not apply to the Guidelines or that the
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government would have to prove the enhancements to a
sentencing jury. Counsel then would appeal the sentencing
decision. If the trial judge's position is upheld by the
Supreme Court, then the defendant must live with the
sentence. If, on the other hand, defense counsel's stated
position is sustained, then the defendant will get a new
sentence. The benefit of this tactic is that the defendant's
sentehce on remand will be presumptively "capped" by the
initial sentence under North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
(1969) (higher sentence imposed following successful appeal
and subsequent conviction gives rise to presumption of
vindictiveness in violation of due process clause). Pearce
applies in the context of a successful appeal of a sentence.
See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 314 F.3d 329 (8th Cir.
2002); United States v. Cox, 299 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2000);
United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 234 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143 (4th Cir.
1995); United States v. Duso, 42 F.3d 365 (6th Cir.
1994).
In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353 (1964), the
Supreme Court held that "an unforeseeable judicial
enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively,
operates precisely like an ex post facto law." Bouie applies in
the sentencing context as well. See, e.g., Hill v. Hopkins, 245
F.3d 1038, 1039 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that, even in the
sentencing context, "an expansion of criminal liability that
occurs by virtue of a shift in the judicial reading of a statute
violates due process if it is both retroactive and
unforeseeable"); Helton v. Fauver, 930 F.2d 1040, 1045 (3d
Cir. 1991) ("the Bouie principle applies equally to
after-the-fact increases in the degree of punishment"). Given
that no court of appeals had held that Apprendi or Ring
applied to the sentencing guidelines, the Blakely decision was
certainly "unforeseeable."
47 In the post-SRA, pre-Mistretta period, similar confusion
affected the plea bargaining process. As two commentators
explained "[S]ince Mistretta had not yet been decided, the
majority of judges refused to apply the Guidelines, or were
willing to hold them unconstitutional whenever the defense
chose to present a challenge. Except ... where the circuit
court of appeals had required all district courts to treat the
Guidelines as constitutional, Guideline implementation was
partial and to some extent unpredictable. Attorneys might
not know if they had a "Guidelines" case until it was assigned
to a judge for trial. Moreover, the defense might not raise a
constitutional challenge in all Guideline cases." Stephen J.
Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 231, 261 (1989) (footnote omitted).
Although as a practical matter much of this discovery might
otherwise be provided, especially if the evidence would be
admissible under FRE 404(b), counsel may be able to obtain
it earlier through more formalized discovery requests.
49 Kansas, which employs sentencing juries, requires disclosure
of the evidence the State will seek to introduce at the
sentencing hearing. See KANSAS STAT. § 21-4718(b)(5) ("Only
such evidence as the state has made known to the defendant
prior to the upward durational departure sentence
proceeding shall be admissible ... ").
FRCrP 32(i)(3) requires the judge, not the jury, to make
sentencing findings. Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) assigns
the role of sentencing fact finder to the judge.
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